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A B S T R A C T
Optimism is associated with positive outcomes across many health domains, from cardiovascular disease to
depression. However, we know little about cognitive processes underlying optimism in psychopathology. The
present study tested whether the ability to vividly imagine positive events in one's future was associated with
dispositional optimism in a sample of depressed adults. Cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses were
conducted, using baseline (all participants, N=150) and follow-up data (participants in the control condition
only, N=63) from a clinical trial (Blackwell et al., 2015). Vividness of positive prospective imagery, assessed on a
laboratory-administered task at baseline, was signiﬁcantly associated with both current optimism levels at
baseline and future (seven months later) optimism levels, including when controlling for potential confounds.
Even when depressed, those individuals able to envision a brighter future were more optimistic, and regained
optimism more quickly over time, than those less able to do so at baseline. Strategies to increase the vividness of
positive prospective imagery may aid development of mental health interventions to boost optimism.
1. Introduction
A neglected area in psychopathology research concerns optimism
and the ability to imagine a more positive future - something that may
be of particular relevance to depression (Holmes et al., 2016). Most
people are staunch “optimists”, expecting good rather than bad things
to happen to themselves in the future (Weinstein, 1980). Deﬁned as the
generalized tendency to expect the future to turn out well, dispositional
optimism is a robust predictor of psychological and physical wellbeing
(Carver and Scheier, 2014; Carver et al., 2010). For example, people
who are more optimistic are less likely to develop depressive symptoms
(Giltay et al., 2006), and they recover from depression more quickly
(Kronström et al., 2011). Given such ﬁndings, it is unsurprising that
optimism has been the subject of extensive research – understanding
its basis could not only illuminate important aspects of resilience, but
also inform development of interventions to harness its beneﬁcial
eﬀects. Numerous factors such as genetics (Bates, 2015; Plomin et al.,
1992), life events (Broekhof et al., 2015), and socio-economic status
(Heinonen et al., 2006) have been identiﬁed as contributing to whether
an individual tends to be optimistic or otherwise. From a clinical
perspective, cognitive processes involved in optimism may be particu-
larly important to understand, as these could provide modiﬁable
targets for psychological interventions.
Dispositional optimism is deﬁned in terms of expectancies for the
future, thus cognitive components of future-oriented thinking provide a
useful focus for investigation. One important way in which people think
about the future is via simulations of possible events using mental
imagery (Schacter et al., 2008, 2012). Mental imagery refers to internal
representations of perceptual experience without external sensory
input, commonly described as “seeing with the mind's eye”, “hearing
with the mind's ear”, and so on (Kosslyn et al., 2001; Pearson et al.,
2015). Theoretical accounts suggest that people may use the experience
of simulating events, such as via mental imagery, as information to help
evaluate and predict the future (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1982;
Szpunar and Schacter, 2013). Could diﬀerences in individuals’ expec-
tancies about the future, that is, how optimistic or pessimistic they are,
be related to how easily they can imagine diﬀerent future possibilities?
Depression is characterized by pessimistic expectancies for the future
(e.g. Alloy and Ahrens, 1987; Beck et al., 1979; Miranda and Mennin,
2007), and emerging evidence suggests that people with depressed
mood (Anderson and Evans, 2014; Holmes et al., 2008; Szőllősi et al.,
2015) or major depressive disorder (Morina et al., 2011), struggle to
generate images of positive events in their future. Speciﬁcally, they
generate less vivid positive prospective mental images than non-
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depressed individuals. Conversely, initial research suggests that people
who are optimistic can imagine positive events in their future
particularly vividly (Blackwell et al., 2013).
Blackwell et al. (2013) examined the relationship between prospec-
tive mental imagery and optimism, using a cross-sectional design in a
community sample (N=237). Higher levels of dispositional optimism,
as measured via the Life Orientation Test – Revised (LOT-R; Scheier
et al., 1994), were associated with higher subjective vividness of mental
imagery for positive future scenarios (on the Prospective Imagery Task;
PIT; Stöber, 2000), even when controlling for socio-demographic
factors, health, general everyday mental imagery use, and vividness
for negative future scenarios. This suggests the possibility that how
vividly someone can imagine positive events in their future may be
related to how optimistic they feel. This idea has intuitive appeal, to the
extent that it may even appear tautological. However, the constructs
measured are distinct: vividness as measured by the PIT is the
perceived visual quality (clarity) of speciﬁc mental images generated,
whereas dispositional optimism as measured by the LOT-R reﬂects the
judgments one generally makes about one's own future, and makes no
reference to imagery or imagined future events. A link between the
quality of an individual's mental imagery and their generalized future
expectancies is therefore interesting both from a theoretical perspec-
tive, contributing to our understanding of the role of imagery-based
simulation in prospective thinking, and from a clinical perspective,
highlighting a potential target for novel interventions. However,
research in this area is preliminary, and many key questions remain.
The current study aimed to replicate the ﬁndings of Blackwell et al.
(2013) and extend them in three main ways, using a sample of 150
depressed individuals from a clinical trial (Blackwell et al., 2015). First,
we aimed to test whether the previously observed relationship between
positive prospective imagery vividness and optimism also holds in a
depressed sample. Baseline data from the trial (pre-intervention;
N=150) allowed us to test the hypothesis that, amongst people with
current major depression, higher vividness ratings for mental imagery
of positive future scenarios (PIT) would be associated with higher
optimism (LOT-R) when controlling for socio-demographic variables,
health, general everyday mental imagery use, and negative imagery
vividness. This provides a direct replication (Schmidt, 2009) of
Blackwell et al. (2013), extended to a depressed sample.
Second, we aimed to rule out the possibility that the relationship
between positive prospective imagery vividness and optimism would
simply be a reﬂection of these measures’ shared variance with relevant,
but previously unmeasured variables, such as depression, anxiety, or
the negative cognitive biases with which these are associated. The trial
data included measures of depression symptoms, trait anxiety, and
interpretation bias, and thus we were able to test the hypothesis that a
unique relationship between positive prospective imagery vividness
and optimism would hold even when controlling for these additional
related factors.
Third, we aimed to extend the previous cross-sectional research and
probe temporal relationships between processes, a crucial step for
addressing questions relating to mechanisms (Kraemer et al., 1997).
The trial included longitudinal data, enabling us to investigate opti-
mism over a seven-month period, using data from participants in the
trial's control condition (N=63). We predicted that higher baseline
positive prospective imagery vividness (PIT) would be associated with
greater optimism seven months later (as indicated by higher scores on
the LOT-R), even when controlling for baseline optimism scores and
other relevant variables (cf. Kleim et al., 2014; Nelis et al., 2015).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Participants were 150 depressed adults (103 female) recruited for a
clinical trial (trial data reported in Blackwell et al., 2015; registered at
clinicaltrials.gov, NCT01443234). Participants were recruited via
advertisements in local media (newspapers and radio), web sites (e.g.
Google, Facebook), and community (e.g. public library), university, and
health settings (e.g. GP practices) in the local area. Advertisements had
taglines such as “Feeling Blue? We need your help!” and included the
information that the study involved completing an “online computer
program” over a four-week period. People who responded to the
advertisements by contacting the research team were emailed an
information sheet about the study, and those interested in
participating then completed screening questionnaires online.
Potentially eligible participants (scoring 14 or above on the Beck
Depression Inventory – II; BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996; i.e. the cut-oﬀ
for mild depression) were invited for a face-to-face eligibility
assessment. Five months into the trial, an additional brief structured
telephone-screening interview was added prior to the face-to-face
assessment to screen out participants obviously meeting exclusion
criteria (e.g. currently receiving psychological therapy, see Blackwell
et al., 2015). Inclusion criteria were: willing and able to give consent to
the study, male or female aged between 18–65; ﬂuent in written and
spoken English; access to the internet in order to complete the online
program (for the trial intervention); able to travel to the research center
for assessment appointments; and meeting Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) criteria for a current major depressive episode
assessed via semi-structured clinical interview (the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM–IV–TR Axis I Disorders, SCID; First et al., 2002).
Exclusion criteria were: current psychological therapy; participation in
concurrent treatment trials; current psychotic or substance-abuse
disorder; history of mania/hypomania; or dosage change of
antidepressant medication during the past month. Ethical approval
was provided by the NRES Committee South Central - Oxford C (11/
SC/0278).
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 65 years (M=35.49,
SD=14.05), with 94.7% reporting their ethnicity as “White”, and
56.7% in paid employment, 28.0% student, 9.3% unemployed, 3.3%
full-time homemaker or carer, and 2.7% retired.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Prospective mental imagery vividness
Was assessed with the Prospective Imagery Task (PIT; Holmes
et al., 2008; Stöber, 2000), a brief paper-based self-report measure.
Participants read descriptions of 10 positive (e.g. “People you meet will
like you”) and 10 negative (“You will be the victim of crime”)
hypothetical future events and were asked to imagine each as if
happening to them in the near future. Participants rated the subjective
vividness of each of their images on a ﬁve-point scale, ranging from 1
(no image at all) to 5 (very vivid). Main predictions concern vividness
ratings for the positive items, and negative items were included to
control for general ability to generate future imagery (Blackwell et al.,
2013). The mean of the vividness ratings for the relevant items is used
as the ‘score’ for each subscale (positive or negative), and thus scores
can range from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating more vivid
imagery.
The PIT has good internal consistency (0.83 < α < 0.90; Blackwell
et al., 2013; see also Stöber, 2000). In our depressed sample, internal
consistency was good for both positive (α=0.85) and negative (α=0.85)
vividness scales.
2.2.2. Optimism
The Life Orientation Test-Revisited (LOT-R; Scheier et al., 1994) is
the most widely used measure of trait optimism. It includes three
positively-framed statements (e.g. ‘‘In uncertain times, I usually expect
the best”) and three reverse-scored negatively-framed statements (e.g.
‘‘If something can go wrong for me, it will”) rated on a 5-point scale
from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). An additional four
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items were ﬁller and not used in scoring. Responses to individual items
are summed to derive a total score (range 0–24), with higher scores
indicating higher trait optimism. The LOT-R has acceptable levels of
test re-test reliability 0.68–0.79), internal consistency (0.70 < α < 0.80;
Scheier et al., 1994), and convergent validity to measures of depres-
sion, life satisfaction and health status (Glaesmer et al., 2012).
2.2.3. Control measures
Symptoms of depression were measured using the Beck Depression
Inventory –Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996), a 21-item self-
report scale that enquires about symptoms of depression over the
previous two weeks. Scores can range from 0 to 63, with higher scores
indicating more severe depression, and are classiﬁed as follows: 0–13:
Minimal depression; 14–19: Mild depression; 20–28: Moderate de-
pression; 29–63: Severe depression (Beck et al., 1996).
Trait anxiety was measured using the Trait scale of the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 1983), a 20-item scale on
which participants are asked to rate various anxiety-related statement
according to how they ‘generally feel’. Higher scores (possible range:
20–80) indicate higher levels of trait anxiety.
General everyday mental imagery use was measured using the
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS; Reisberg et al., 2003), a
widely used 12- item scale measuring the tendency to use imagery in
daily tasks and situations (e.g. “When I think about a series of errands I
must do, I visualise the shops I will visit”). Responses are made on a 4-
point scale, anchored from 1 (never appropriate) to 4 (always
appropriate). Higher scores (range: 12–48) indicate a greater tendency
to use imagery in everyday life.
Negative interpretation bias was measured using the Scrambled
Sentences Test (SST; Rude et al., 2002). Participants unscrambled a list
of 20 scrambled sentences (e.g. winner born I am loser a) under a
cognitive load (remembering a 6 digit number). This measured the
tendency of participants to interpret ambiguous information either
positively (I am a born winner) or negatively (I am a born loser). A
‘negativity’ score is generated by calculating the proportion of sen-
tences completed correctly with a negative emotional valence. Scores
can thus range continuously between 0 and 1, with higher scores
indicating a more negative bias.
General health status was measured using the EuroQol-5D-3 L
visual analogue scale (EQ5D; Kind, 1996), a self-report measure of
health-related quality of life. Participants self-rate their current health
status on a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS), the endpoints of which are
labelled "Best imaginable health state" (100) and "Worst imaginable
health state" (0). Scores can therefore range from 0 to 100, with higher
scores indicating better self-rated health.
2.3. Procedure
Eligibility was conﬁrmed via a face-to-face assessment including the
SCID interview. The baseline data reported in this paper were collected
during a second face-to-face assessment. Baseline measures (with the
exception of the scrambled sentences test) were administered prior to
randomization into the trial, and thus at this time point both
participant and researcher were blind to participant allocation. The
LOT-R was completed again online (or pen-and-paper questionnaires
returned via post) six months after the end of the four-week trial
intervention, i.e. seven months after the baseline assessment.
The trial within which this data was collected compared an
intervention involving repeated generation of positive mental imagery
to a non-imagery “sham training” control condition, both delivered via
the internet. See Blackwell et al. (2015) for full details of the clinical
trial procedures and main outcomes.
2.4. Data analysis
Analyses were conducted via a series of linear regressions. The
approach taken was to begin with only the primary variables of interest
in the regression (e.g. for the cross-sectional analyses, vividness ratings
for positive items on the PIT at baseline as the independent variable,
and LOT-R scores at baseline as the dependent variable), with
additional potential confounding factors added as independent vari-
ables in a series of additional steps to examine how the original
relationship of interest was aﬀected by inclusion of these variables at
each stage. Details of the regressions and the variables included at each
step are presented in the results section.
All variables included were continuous, with the exception of the
following socio-demographic variables, which for replication purposes
were coded as binary categorical variables to correspond as closely as
possible to the categories used by Blackwell et al. (2013): gender
(0=male, 1=female); educational level (0=≤13 years of education; 1= >
13 years of education), relationship status (0=single/divorced/sepa-
rated; 1=married/cohabiting), and nationality (0=non-UK; 1=UK).
The robustness of the analyses with regards to multivariate outliers
and collinearity was veriﬁed via examination of residual plots, Cook's D
values, and Tolerance/Variance Inﬂation Factors (Clark-Carter, 2010;
Fox, 2008), in consultation with a statistician.
3. Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample, including
socio-demographic information, and zero-order correlations with base-
line optimism (LOT-R; M=8.07; SD=4.35).
3.1. Baseline optimism and vividness of prospective mental imagery
To test our hypothesis that greater ability to vividly imagine positive
future events would be associated with higher levels of optimism,
including when controlling for additional potentially confounding
variables, a four-step linear regression was used. Baseline LOT-R score
was the dependent variable, and baseline vividness for positive items
on the PIT was the main independent variable of interest.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for baseline variables included in cross-sectional analyses, and zero-
order correlations with baseline score on the Life Orientation Test – Revised.
Variable M (SD) or N (%) r0
Optimism and positive imagery vividness
LOT-R 8.07 (4.35) –
PIT Positive Imagery Vividness 2.85 (0.84) 0.36***
Socio-demographic variables
Age (years) 35.49 (14.05) 0.09
Gender - Female 103 (68.67%) −0.11
> 13 years education 121 (80.67%) 0.13
Married/Cohabiting 56 (37.33%) −0.00
Physical Health (EQ−5D VAS) 60.15 (19.53) 0.30***
UK nationality 126 (84.00%) −0.08
General imagery use and negative imagery vividness
SUIS score 39.41 (8.99) 0.08
PIT Negative Imagery Vividness 3.34 (0.86) −0.15
Interpretation bias, Depression, and Anxiety
BDI-II score 30.54 (9.41) −0.52***
STAI-T score 61.29 (6.59) −0.60***
SST Negativity score 0.59 (0.24) −0.56***
N=150. r0=zero order correlations with baseline LOT-R score; LOT-R=Life Orientation
Test - Revised; PIT Negative/Positive Imagery Vividness=imagery vividness ratings for
negative/positive items on the Prospective Imagery Test (PIT); EQ-5D=Euroqol-5D-3L
(self-rated health rated from “Worst imaginable health state”, scored as 0, to “Best
imaginable health state”, scored as 100); SUIS=Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale; BDI-
II=Beck Depression Inventory - II; STAI-T=State-Trait Anxiety Inventory - Trait version;
SST Negativity=Scrambled Sentences Task negativity score. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p <
0.001.
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The ﬁrst three steps tested whether the ﬁndings of Blackwell et al.
(2013) would replicate in a depressed sample, by controlling for the
same variables as in this previous study. In the ﬁrst step, vividness
ratings for positive items on the PIT were included as the only
independent variable. In the second step, socio-demographic factors
as used by Blackwell et al. (2013) were included as additional
potentially confounding independent variables. In the third step,
vividness ratings for negative items on the PIT and scores on the
SUIS were included as additional independent variables to control for
vividness of negative prospective imagery and general imagery use. A
fourth step provided an extension of the previous research, by
additionally controlling for depression, anxiety and interpretation bias
(not included in the study by Blackwell et al., 2013). Including these
additional variables allowed us to test further the speciﬁcity of the
relationship between positive imagery vividness and optimism.
To summarize, variables entered were: Step 1, vividness ratings for
PIT positive items; Step 2, socio-demographic variables (age, gender,
marital status, self-rated health, nationality, education); Step 3, SUIS
score and PIT negative item vividness ratings; Step 4, BDI-II, STAI-T
and SST scores. All 150 participants were included in the analysis.
Results are summarized in Table 2. In the initial model (Step 1),
with vividness ratings for PIT positive items as the only independent
variable, higher vividness ratings were associated with higher LOT-R
scores (β=0.356 [95% CI: 0.204, 0.508], p < 0.001). The relationship
between vividness ratings for PIT positive items and LOT-R scores
remained signiﬁcant when socio-demographic variables were entered
in Step 2 (β=0.378 [0.232, 0.524], p < 0.001), and when vividness
ratings for PIT negative items and SUIS scores were entered in Step 3
(β=0.554 [0.391, 0.717], p < 0.001). In the ﬁnal model, higher vivid-
ness ratings for PIT positive items were signiﬁcantly associated with
higher LOT-R scores (β=0.314 [0.151, 0.476], p < 0.001). The only
other statistically signiﬁcant independent variable was trait anxiety
(STAI-T), which was negatively associated with LOT-R score
(β=−0.315 [−0.483, −0.145], p < 0.001).
3.2. Predicting optimism at seven months
A three-step linear regression model was used to test whether
vividness of positive prospective imagery at baseline predicted opti-
mism seven months later, over and above baseline optimism and other
potentially relevant variables. This analysis used participants from the
control condition (as this involved no positive imagery practice),1 who
completed the LOT-R at the ﬁnal study assessment (n=63). There were
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences at baseline in any variables included in the
previous regression between those who did versus did not complete
(n=11) the ﬁnal LOT-R, except for self-rated health (EQ-5D): those
who did not complete the LOT-R at seven months scored lower on this
measure at baseline (M=48.55, SD=15.02) than those who did
complete it (M=60.68, SD=19.04), t (72)=2.00, p=0.049.
The dependent variable in the regression was LOT-R score at seven
months, and the main independent variable of interest was vividness
for positive items on the PIT at baseline. Potentially relevant con-
founding variables included in the regression were LOT-R and BDI-II
scores at baseline, and variables with a signiﬁcant relationship with
optimism in our previous regression (i.e. STAI-T at baseline).
Results are summarized in Table 3. In Step 1 of the model, baseline
vividness ratings for positive items on the PIT were entered, showing
that higher vividness ratings at baseline predicted higher LOT-R scores
seven months later (β=0.442 [95% CI: 0.212, 0.671], p < 0.001). In
Step 2, baseline LOT-R scores were entered. When adjusted for
baseline optimism, higher vividness ratings for positive PIT items
(β=0.260 [0.061, 0.459], p=0.011) still predicted higher LOT-R scores
seven months later. In Step 3, baseline STAI-T and BDI-II scores were
entered. When additionally adjusted for baseline anxiety and depres-
sion, higher vividness ratings for positive items of the PIT (β=0.249
[0.054, 0.444], p=0.013) still predicted higher LOT-R scores seven
months later. In this ﬁnal model, only higher LOT-R scores (β=0.501
[0.230, 0.772], p < 0.001) at baseline also signiﬁcantly predicted higher
LOT-R scores seven months later.
To test the temporal nature of the relationship (i.e. that positive
prospective imagery vividness predicted future optimism, but not vice
versa), the opposite direction of prediction was tested (cf. Nelis et al.,
2015). We carried out an equivalent regression, but with PIT positive
imagery vividness ratings at seven months as dependent variable. In a
ﬁrst step, including only baseline LOT-R score as a predictor, baseline
LOT-R score (β=0.312 [95% CI: 0.067, 0.557], p=0.014) signiﬁcantly
predicted PIT positive imagery scores seven months later. However,
when adjusting for baseline PIT positive imagery scores in a second
step, baseline LOT-R score (β=0.148 [−0.078, 0.373], p=0.195) no
longer predicted PIT positive imagery scores seven months later. In the
third and ﬁnal step, in which baseline BDI-II and STAI-T scores were
additionally entered as predictors, baseline LOT-R score (β=−0.022
[−0.328, 0.284], p=0.886) did not predict positive imagery vividness
seven months later.
Table 2
Positive prospective mental imagery vividness and optimism at baseline: cross-sectional
regression analysis with Life Orientation Test – Revised score as dependent variable.
Independent variable Model 1 β Model 2 β Model 3 β Model 4 β
PIT Positive Vividness 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.55*** 0.31***
Age (years) 0.28*** 0.20** 0.08
Gender (female) −0.14 −0.11 −0.08
> 13 years education 0.12 0.10 0.11
Married/Cohabiting −0.06 −0.04 −0.02
EQ−5D 0.31*** 0.23** 0.10
UK nationality −0.04 −0.03 0.00
SUIS 0.02 0.02
PIT Negative Vividness −0.36*** −0.12
BDI-II −0.15
STAI-T −0.31***
SST Negativity −0.13
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.26 0.33 0.49
ΔR2 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.16
F for ΔR2 21.49*** 5.45*** 8.88*** 15.82***
F for model 21.49*** 8.30*** 9.14*** 12.99***
N=150. Four-step linear regression with LOT-R score as dependent variable: Model 1
includes positive prospective imagery vividness only. Model 2 additionally includes socio-
demographic variables. Model 3 additionally includes control imagery variables. Model 4
additionally includes depression, trait anxiety, and negative interpretation bias. LOT-
R=Life Orientation Rest - Revised; PIT Negative/Positive Vividness=imagery vividness
ratings for negative/positive items on the Prospective Imagery Test (PIT); EQ-
5D=Euroqol-5D-3L (self-rated health rated from “Worst imaginable health state”, scored
as 0, to “Best imaginable health state”, scored as 100); SUIS=Spontaneous Use of
Imagery Scale; BDI-II=Beck Depression Inventory - II; STAI-T=State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory - Trait version; SST Negativity=Scrambled Sentences Task negativity score. *p
< 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
1 We additionally carried out the same regression with all participants providing data
for the LOT-R at the ﬁnal study assessment (n=130), controlling for condition (i.e. which
intervention the participant was randomized to) by including condition as a binary
predictor variable (i.e. positive imagery or control) in the regression. This yielded an
equivalent result, with baseline PIT positive imagery vividness signiﬁcantly predicting
LOT-R seven months later (β=0.211 [0.063, 0.358], p=0.005). There were no diﬀerences
between conditions in scores on the LOT-R at any time point (all ts < 1), consistent with
the main trial analyses showing no diﬀerence between conditions in reduction in
symptoms of depression (Blackwell et al., 2015). However, in our main prediction
analyses we restricted the regression to participants in the control condition, as the
positive imagery intervention involved repeated generation of positive mental imagery
over a four-week period, and this might complicate interpretation of eﬀects of baseline
imagery vividness on subsequent outcomes. Further, as there were some between-group
diﬀerences in outcomes in post-hoc analyses (e.g. for anhedonic symptoms), we would be
cautious about interpreting the positive imagery intervention as equivalent to the control
condition.
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3.3. Speciﬁcity of longitudinal prediction
In additional exploratory analyses, we investigated whether positive
imagery vividness at baseline might be a broader predictor of positive
outcomes at seven months, rather than speciﬁcally predicting optimism
only. We therefore repeated the regression presented in Table 3, but
ﬁrst with BDI-II at seven months as the dependent variable, and
adding baseline PIT positive imagery vividness, baseline BDI-II, and
baseline LOT-R and STAI-T as predictors in three successive steps. In
isolation (Step 1), higher baseline positive imagery vividness did
predict lower BDI-II scores at seven months (β=−0.261 [95% CI:
−0.506, −0.016], p=0.037), but when adjusted for baseline BDI-II
(Step 2), this prediction was no longer statistically signiﬁcant
(β=−0.186 [−0.414, 0.043], p=0.109). When additionally adjusted for
baseline LOT-R and STAI-T scores (Step 3), baseline PIT positive
vividness again did not signiﬁcantly predict BDI-II scores seven
months later (β=−0.218 [−0.450, 0.014], p=0.066).
We then conducted an equivalent regression with STAI-T scores at
seven months as the outcome variable, and with baseline PIT-PV,
baseline STAI-T, and baseline LOT-R and BDI-II added as predictors in
successive steps. In isolation (Step 1), higher baseline positive imagery
vividness did predict lower STAI-T scores at seven months (β=−0.323
[−0.567, −0.078], p=0.011), but when adjusted for baseline STAI-T
(Step 2), this prediction was no longer statistically signiﬁcant
(β=−0.209 [−0.433, 0.015], p=0.067). When additionally adjusted for
baseline LOT-R and BDI-II scores (Step 3), baseline PIT positive
vividness did signiﬁcantly predict STAI-T scores seven months later
(β=−0.240 [−0.470, −0.011], p=0.041).
3.4. Optimism/pessimism dimensions of the LOT-R
Following suggestions (e.g. Kubzansky et al., 2004) that the LOT-R
can be seen as assessing two related but separate constructs, optimism
(via the positively-worded items) and pessimism (via the negatively-
worded items), in exploratory analyses we repeated the cross-sectional
and main longitudinal regression using these separate subscales as
dependent variables rather than the whole LOT-R score. The main
results remained unchanged. For the cross-section analysis, higher
vividness ratings of PIT positive items were signiﬁcantly associated
with higher LOT-R optimism subscale scores (β=0.307 [95% CIs:
0.136, 0.478], p=0.001) and lower LOT-R pessimism subscale scores
(β=−0.264 [−0.440, −0.087], p=0.004). For the longitudinal analysis,
higher vividness ratings of PIT positive items at baseline predicted
higher LOT-R optimism subscale scores at 7 months (β=0.238 [0.065,
0.412], p=0.008) and lower LOT-R pessimism subscale scores at 7
months (β=−0.232 [−0.453, −0.010], p=0.041).
4. Discussion
Scores on a simple laboratory-administered measure assessing how
vividly individuals with depression could imagine positive future life
events were statistically signiﬁcantly related not only to current levels
of dispositional optimism, but also to how optimistic people were seven
months later. These ﬁndings conﬁrm a test of replication of Blackwell
et al. (2013), and critically, extend them as follows: First, the cross-
sectional relationship between positive prospective imagery vividness
and dispositional optimism, as measured by the Life Orientation Test-
Revised, generalized from a community sample to a clinical sample of
people with depression. Second, results provide further evidence for
potential speciﬁcity of the relationship by controlling for depression,
anxiety, and interpretation bias. Third, the temporal component shows
that positive prospective imagery vividness predicted future optimism
(but not vice versa). Together, results highlight positive prospective
imagery vividness as a potential cognitive mechanism underlying
optimism.
Why might the ability to vividly conjure up scenes of positive future
events in our lives be important in shaping how we feel about our
future? Functional theories of prospection view mental imagery as a
core component of the ‘prospective brain’, enabling individuals to
predict and plan for the future using perceptual simulations (Moulton
and Kosslyn, 2009; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). Importantly,
perceptual simulations of experiences using mental imagery can evoke
neurophysiological and emotional responses as if the experience was
real (Ji et al., 2016). Individuals may use the experience of simulating
speciﬁc events as information to help evaluate the future. For example,
they may interpret the ease with which a particular hypothetical event
comes to mind as reﬂective of the likelihood of similar events occurring
in real life (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Szpunar and Schacter,
2013). In other words, people form expectancies of the future by
“seeing” it through the “mind's binoculars”. The powerful emotional
impact of mental imagery (Holmes and Mathews, 2005) and its
‘realness’ (Mathews et al., 2013) underscore how imagery-based future
simulations may inﬂuence how optimistic or otherwise we feel.
While our hypotheses concerned the relationship between positive
imagery vividness and optimism, the relationship between vividness
ratings for negative items on the Prospective Imagery Test (PIT) and
LOT-R scores observed in the cross-sectional analysis is also of note.
We found that there was no statistically signiﬁcant zero-order relation-
ship between negative prospective imagery and optimism, but when
controlling for positive imagery vividness in the regression, a signiﬁ-
cant (negative) relationship between negative imagery vividness and
optimism emerged. Interestingly, this replicates the pattern of results
found by Blackwell et al. (2013) in relation to negative imagery
vividness. In the current study, the addition of depression, trait anxiety,
and interpretation bias in the fourth step of the regression reduced the
relationship between negative imagery vividness and optimism to
statistical non-signiﬁcance. Exploration of this reduction to non-
signiﬁcance indicated that it occurred due to the addition of the
STAI-T (trait anxiety) to the regression. Thus, it appears that the
signiﬁcant relationship between negative imagery vividness and opti-
mism that emerges when positive imagery vividness is controlled for
reﬂects an association between negative imagery vividness and anxiety,
rather than being speciﬁc to optimism. This is consistent with
theoretical accounts (cf. Miloyan et al., 2013), and with the ﬁnding
from previous research that people with anxiety disorders reported
signiﬁcantly higher vividness ratings on for negative items on the PIT
than people with major depression and healthy controls (Morina et al.,
Table 3
Positive prospective mental imagery vividness and optimism seven months later:
longitudinal analysis.
Predictor M (SD) r0 Model 1 β Model 2 β Model 3 β
PIT Positive
Vividness
2.88 (0.83) 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.26* 0.25*
LOT-R Baseline 7.90 (4.70) 0.64*** 0.56*** 0.50***
STAI-T 61.51
(7.11)
−0.54*** −0.29
BDI-II 30.86
(10.38)
−0.32* 0.23
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.45 0.48
ΔR2 0.20 0.28 0.04
F for ΔR2 14.78*** 31.29*** 2.27
F for model 14.78*** 26.71*** 15.06***
N=63. Three-step linear regression model with LOT-R score at the end of the study
(seven months post-baseline) as dependent variable. Model 1 includes positive prospec-
tive imagery vividness only. Model 2 additionally includes baseline LOT-R score. Model 3
additionally includes baseline variables previously shown to have a signiﬁcant relation-
ship with optimism at baseline in the previous cross-sectional analysis (STAI-T) and
baseline levels of depression (BDI-II). r0=zero order correlations with LOT-R score at
seven months post-baseline. PIT Positive Vividness=imagery vividness ratings for
positive items on the Prospective Imagery Test; LOT-R=Life Orientation Test –
Revised; STAI-T – State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait version; BDI-II=Beck
Depression Inventory – II. p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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2011). Conversely, the relationship between positive imagery vividness
and optimism appears to be more speciﬁc.
Our ﬁnding that vividness of positive prospective imagery predicted
optimism seven months later can be interpreted as indicating that
reduced ability to generate vivid positive prospective imagery is a “risk
factor” (Kraemer et al., 1997; Oﬀord and Kraemer, 2000) for reduced
recovery of optimism over time. This could mean either that reduced
positive prospective imagery vividness is a marker of individuals who
may particularly beneﬁt from an intervention to increase optimism or
compensate for negative eﬀects of reduced optimism (if it is a “ﬁxed” or
“variable” risk factor; Oﬀord and Kraemer, 2000), or that increasing
individuals’ ability to vividly imagine positive future events may
provide a route to increase their dispositional optimism (if a “causal”
risk factor). From another perspective, the ability to vividly imagine
positive future events could be said to be a “protective factor” (Oﬀord
and Kraemer, 2000) for optimism. While psychopathology research has
tended to focus on dysfunctional processes, positive protective factors
such as optimism may be particularly important in recovery and
remission (e.g. Boelen, 2015; Teismann et al., 2016; Trumpf et al.,
2009).
In addition to testing whether positive imagery vividness at baseline
predicted optimism at seven months, in exploratory analyses we
investigated the speciﬁcity of this prediction. That is, we carried out
additional regressions to test whether positive imagery vividness at
baseline also predicted depression or trait anxiety seven months later.
These results were more equivocal, and we note that if we were to
correct for the multiple analyses (i.e. Bonferroni correction for the
three prediction regressions), only prediction of the LOT-R by baseline
PIT positive imagery vividness would survive this more stringent
probability threshold (p < 0.017). However, the regression coeﬃcients
for PIT positive imagery vividness scores were similar in all three
regressions, and overall the results do not provide strong evidence for
the suggestion that positive prospective imagery vividness predicts only
future optimism. In fact, such as result would be surprising given the
relationship between optimism, depression, and anxiety. In future
studies it would be interesting to investigate the mechanisms linking
these facets of psychopathology and wellbeing, and the underlying
processes, ideally within the context of an experimental manipulation
to test causality and allow conclusions about the direction of eﬀects.
Could increasing the vividness with which individuals can imagine
positive events in their future lead to increases in their optimism? This
possibility has yet to be demonstrated. In the trial from which the
current data was derived, there was no diﬀerence between the two
intervention conditions in the change in positive imagery vividness (as
measured by the PIT) over time (Blackwell et al., 2015), and thus
potential causal relations could not be examined. Conversely, in a
sample of healthy older adults, Murphy et al. (2015) found that while
completing a four-week positive imagery intervention based on that of
Blackwell et al. (2015) led to increases in vividness ratings for positive
items on the PIT, it did not lead to increases in optimism as measured
by the LOT-R, compared to a control condition. This dissociation could
potentially indicate that positive imagery vividness is not a direct
causal driver of dispositional optimism. However, participants in
Murphy et al. (2015) had high levels of optimism at baseline, therefore
the absence of further increases in optimism may reﬂect a ceiling eﬀect.
Additionally, it may be that a sustained increase in positive imagery
vividness and a longer time-period of measurement would be required
to observe changes in self-reported trait optimism as measured by the
LOT-R. Increases in self-reported optimism in healthy populations
have been induced via brief (Peters et al., 2010) and longer (e.g. two
weeks; Meevissen et al., 2011) positive imagery exercises involving
imagining a ‘best possible self’ in the future (see also Malouﬀ and
Schutte, 2016). However, the mechanisms or longevity of such eﬀects
are not yet known. It is worth noting that high vividness ratings on the
PIT may reﬂect frequent engagement in similar prospective imagery in
everyday life, increasing its accessibility or increasing its vividness via
rehearsal (cf. Szpunar and Schacter, 2013), and it could be this
frequent engagement in positive imagery (rather than vividness per
se) that relates to optimism. Thus, the nature of the relationship
between positive mental imagery and optimism, and whether training
positive mental imagery can lead to sustained beneﬁcial changes in
optimism in clinical populations such as depressed individuals remains
to be determined (Holmes et al., 2016).
In the current study we measured optimism using the widely-used
Life Orientation Test – Revised (LOT-R; Scheier et al., 1994). While
there are a number of ways to operationalize or measure the construct
of optimism, self-report dispositional optimism as measured by the
LOT-R appears a robust predictor of psychological and physical well-
being (Carver et al., 2010), over and above alternative factors proposed
to explain optimism's beneﬁcial eﬀects, such as neuroticism and self-
eﬃcacy (Scheier et al., 1994). Whether these beneﬁts are in fact a
consequence of having an optimistic outlook (e.g. one's positive
expectancies about the future leading to a more adaptive course of
action or buﬀering against stress), or rather result from one or more of
the processes that potentially underpin optimism, such as biases in
attention, memory, and interpretation, (Fox, 2012) or belief-updating
mechanisms (Sharot et al., 2011), remains to be determined. Future
studies aiming to manipulate processes hypothesized to contribute to
optimism and explore the potential beneﬁts may therefore proﬁt from
measuring the direct eﬀects of the manipulation on optimism-related
behavioural or emotional outcomes of interest, particularly as disposi-
tional (i.e. trait) optimism (as measured by the LOT-R) may be slow to
change. The trial data included a measure of negative interpretation
bias, allowing us to control for this aspect of depression-relevant
cognition when examining the relationship between positive prospec-
tive imagery vividness and optimism. However, given that depression is
characterized by a number of other cognitive biases and deﬁcits
(Browning et al., 2013; Gotlib and Joormann, 2010), including in
relation to future-oriented thinking (e.g. MacLeod and Salaminiou,
2001; Miranda and Mennin, 2007), exploring potential links between
imagery vividness, optimism, and other cognitive biases and dysfunc-
tions in depression will help to further elucidate mechanisms and guide
treatment development.
A limitation of the study is that longitudinal data cannot themselves
provide evidence of causal relationships. Further, participants received
an intervention (albeit in a control condition) in the ﬁrst four weeks of
the seven-month time period, and thus similar results may not be
found in naturalistic settings with no intervention. Participants were
recruited for a research study of an internet-delivered intervention for
depression, and thus the sample may not be representative of the
broader general population. Finally, we assume that increases in
optimism would be desirable; while there is some debate about whether
the apparent “optimism bias” (Sharot, 2011) observed in the general
population is in fact “unrealistic” or otherwise (Harris and Hahn,
2011), excessive optimism may not always be optimal (Carver and
Scheier, 2014). The results of this study need to be interpreted in the
context of the trial from which the data originates; that is, they derive
from a secondary analysis of data from a trial that was not speciﬁcally
designed to test this paper's hypotheses. However, the opportunity to
examine both cross-sectional and longitudinal data within a sample of
150 depressed individuals presents a valuable opportunity for clinical
research.
In summary, the present results suggest that even when individuals
are depressed, those able to envision a brighter future are relatively
more optimistic, and regain optimism more quickly, than those less
able to do so. The ability to vividly imagine positive events in the future,
and thus see it through “rose-tinted binoculars”, provides a potentially
modiﬁable cognitive target warranting further research to inform
mental health treatment innovation.
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